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OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
must be under the necessity, if he wishes to claim the substance, of
framing two claims each of which must be valid. It is apparent that
a claim to such a substance can not be supported by a process claim
which is invalid.
The Court discussed its previous decision in the Commissioner of
Patents v. Winthrop Chemical Company Inc., [1948] S.C.R. 46, 7
Fox Pat. C. 183. In that case it was held that a claim for a substance
alone can not, under section 41 (1) of the Patent Act, be entertained
and the applicant's specification should describe the method or process
by which the substance is prepared or produced and claim a patent
therefor in the manner specified in the Act. The Court pointed out
and held that the reasoning of the Winthrop case was authority not
only for the precise point before the Court in that case, namely, that
an applicant for a patent for a substance under section 41(1) must
make a specific process claim, but was applicable also to the issue
before the Court in the present case, namely, that there can not be
a valid patent for a substance within that subsection if the process
claim, which has been made for the process of its production, is found
to be invalid.
H.G.F.
L. REALTY
(i) EXPROPRIATION
In four cases the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the
law on the principle of compensation in expropriation procedures.
Two of these were appeals from the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the
other two came from the Exchequer Court (both involving Her
Majesty in right of Canada).
In all these cases the basic issue was-"the value of the land".
The variations between the amounts of compensation sought by the
owner and those offered by the expropriating authority, recommend-
ed by the proper administrative tribunal, or eventually awarded by
the courts are a constant source of amazement to the layman and to
the lawyer alike.
Mr. Justice Abbott delivering the majority judgment in Standish-
Hall Hotel Inc. v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 64 at 71 says: " .... in a
case such as this the tribunal of fact must first determine in accord-
ance with well established principles the value of the land to the owner
as of the date of expropriation.. ." (emphasis added). This statement
is most reassuring, yet disconcertingly only in one out of the four
cases did the Supreme Court render a unanimous judgment. The aver-
age student or practitioner might well wonder what well established
principles Abbott J. is talking about.
(VOL. 3
Supreme Court Review
A brief factual survey of the cases follows.
The Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto v. Samuel, Son & Co. Ltd.,
[1963] S.C.R. 175.
In this case dealing with the expropriation of industrial land the
Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal affirming a unani-
mous Court of Appeal decision. The court held that the correct basis
for computing compensation payable is to ascertain the market value
of the land plus the replacement cost of the building in the new loca-
tion, less depreciation of the old building. To this sum the cost of
moving the plant is to be added, as well as an allowance for the
physical dislocation of business, for disruption of business and minor
matters, lumped together under "Additional allowance, disturbance,
moving, etc."
The arbitrator had awarded 10% additional allowance for com-
pulsory taking before the decision in Drew v. The Queen, [1961]
S.C.R. 614. Hence this award had to be disallowed by the Court of
Appeal.
This was the clearest case considered and no more will be said
about it except to point out that the value to the owner was found
by taking the market value of the land plus the value which the
building had on account of its suitability for the owner's purposes.
The Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority v.
Valley Improvement Company Limited, [1963] S.C.R. 15.
The land involved was the low-lying strip along the Humber
River, part of a larger tract of land owned b ; respondent and on
which it operated a restaurant, tennis courts and bowling greens. The
"value to the owner"-the test adopted by the courts since the Su-
preme Court decision in Woods Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. The King,
[1951] S.C.R. 504-depended on the use to which the respondent
planned to put that particular strip of land.
It also depended on the use to which the land retained by respon-
dent could legally be put. "These expropriated lands could only have
value to the owner of the amount assigned to them by the respondent
if they remained part of the whole and were rezoned," as Judson J.
said at page 34.
Compensation was proferred at a rate of $739 per acre. The
owner held out for about $24,500 per acre. He stated in argument
that were the lands rezoned to permit the construction of apartment
buildings, the value would be even higher, viz., $40,000 per acre. But
the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that this value should be
discounted by 331/3% because of the "uncertainties and delays im-
plicit in the necessity of obtaining appropriate rezoning." (p. 22)
The value to the owner thus depended largely on the speculative
element of rezoning. The Ontario Municipal Board had come to the
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